
The Causes of the Financial Crisis and its Consequences

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What Happened

Timeline of the Financial Crisis




Fall 2005-Spring 2007

- ▶ Fall 2005: growth of housing bubble slows
- ▶ <u>Summer 2006</u>: housing prices begin to decline
- Winter 2006: default rates on lower-rated subprime private mortgage-backed securities (PMBS) begin exceeding normally expected rates in a deflating bubble
- Spring 2007: abnormal default rates cause prices of AAArated PMBS to steeply decline

Fall 2007

- Market for PMBSs, CDOs, and ABSs shuts down
- Value of MBSs and CDOs falls sharply
- Mark-to-market accounting forces large banks to write down securitized assets
- Write-downs cause downward spiral in banks' capital and questions about solvency and stability



March 2008

- Bear Stearns has difficulty raising short-term financing;
 customers begin to withdraw their money
- Bear is sold to JP Morgan Chase with Federal Reserve assistance
- The Fed opens its discount window to the four remaining investment banks
 - Fed actions provide only temporary relief

September 2008

- September 7: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs) are placed into conservatorship
- Week of September 15:
 - Lehman Brothers fails
 - Merrill Lynch is acquired by Bank of America
 - Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding cos.
 - AIG is rescued
 - Reserve Fund is rescued and other money market mutual funds are guaranteed
 - Banks and financial intermediaries around the world stop lending
 - Bernanke and Paulson ask Congress for \$770 billion in TARP funds
 - Congress initially refuses; Dow falls over 700 points in single day

Cause and Effect

- The mortgage meltdown and the current financial crisis are connected
 - Unprecedented default rates on mortgages underlying MBSs caused complete shutdown of ABS market
 - Collapse of ABS market, combined with mark-to-market accounting, caused banks to write down the value of their securitized assets, calling their solvency into question
 - Failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers caused a sharp drop in interbank lending and a hoarding of cash, cutting credit availability and deepening the recession

This Housing Bubble was Different

- This bubble contained 27 million subprime and Alt-A loans
 - Comprising almost 50 % of all single family mortgages in the U.S.
 - ▶ Total value of over \$4 trillion
- Foreclosure rates on these mortgages were and are several times greater than even the rates seen in the Great Depression

Why It Happened

Why were almost 50% of the mortgages in the bubble subprime or Alt-A?

Government Policies & the Financial Crisis Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

- ▶ 1992: Fannie and Freddie are given an affordable housing (AH) mission
 - ▶ 30% of purchases must be loans to borrowers at 100% of median income or below (LMI borrowers)
- ▶ <u>1995</u>: HUD authorizes subprime and Alt-A loans to meet AH guidelines
- 2005: HUD requires 55% of purchases to be LMI, with 25% low income
- As HUD's regulations tighten, Fannie and Freddie lower underwriting standards to include more subprime and Alt-A loans

GSE Purchases of Subprime & Alt-A Loans

	1997		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Pr	roduct Total
Subprime PMBS	\$ 3	\$	38	\$ 82	\$ 108	\$ 169	\$ 110	\$ 62	\$	644
Subprime Loans	\$ 37	\$	206	\$ 262	\$ 144	\$ 139	\$ 138	\$ 195	\$	1,121
Alt-A PMBS*	\$ _	\$	18	\$ 12	\$ 30	\$ 36	\$ 43	\$ 15	\$	154
Alt-A Loans	\$ _	\$	66	\$ 77	\$ 64	\$ 77	\$ 157	\$ 178	\$	619
High LTV Loans**	\$ 32	\$	102	\$ 128	\$ 84	\$ 71	\$ 74	\$ 171	\$	662
Yearly Total ***	\$ 63	\$	388	\$ 509	\$ 467	\$ 460	\$ 481	\$ 544	\$	2,912

All \$ values are in billions

^{*}Alt-A PMBS for 2002-2005 values are estimates

^{**} Original LTV ratio is greater than 90%

^{***} Yearly totals are deduped for overlaps among loan groups, deduped sum of yearly totals is \$2,192 billion; product totals are non-deduped, non-deduped sum of product totals is \$3,200


Who was responsible

In mid-2008, the 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages were held, guaranteed or had been securitized by the following entities, and had the following unpaid principal amount:

of loans UPA
million \$1.8 trillion
million .6
2 million .3
2 million \$2.7 trillion
8 million \$1.9 trillion
million \$4.6 trillion

Source: http://www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-Sizing-Total-Federal-Contributions.pdf

Breakdown of 27 Million Subprime and Alt-A Mortgages



- Subprime and Alt-A mortgages held or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie(12 million)
- Subprime and Alt-A mortgages held by FHA, VA, and other Federal agencies (5 million)
- Subprime and Alt-A mortgages held by four largest banks, under CRA committments and Countrywide Financial, under HUD program (2.2 million)
- Other Subprime and Alt-A mortgages securitized by Wall Street (7.8 million)

Home ownership increased

- Home ownership, which had been 64% for 30 years, grew to more than 69% between 1995 and 2005
- Congress and two administrations supported the policies that produced this growth
- There was no chance that regulators would have been able to stop the growth in subprime lending
- Congress resisted Bush efforts to curb the GSEs
- Now, Congress and the administration point fingers at everyone else
- The financial crisis has become an excuse for taking control of the financial system

Subprime, Nonprime, and Alt-A Loans:

Defaulting at Unprecedented Rates

Loan Types	Estimated # of Loans	Total Delinquency (30+ Days and in Foreclosure)						
1. High Rate Subprime	6 million	45.0%						
2. Option Arm	1.1 million	30.5%						
3. Alt-A	1.9 million [†]	23.0%						
4. Fannie Subprime/Alt-A/Nonprime	5.7 million	17.3%						
5. Freddie Subprime/Alt-A/Nonprime	3.1 million	13.8%						
6. Government/Other	5.5 million	13.5%						
Subtotal # of Loans	23.3 million							
7. Non-Agency Jumbo Prime	7.5 million [‡]	6.8%						
8. Non-Agency Conforming Prime*	7.5 million	5.6%						
9. Fannie Prime**	12.2 million	2.6%						
10. Freddie Prime***	8.8 million	2.0%						
Total # of Loans	51.8 million							

^{*} Includes an unknown amount of subprime (FICO<660) and other nonprime loans

- † Excludes loans owned or securitized by Fannie and Freddie
- ‡ Non-agency jumbo prime and conforming prime counted together

Sources:

- 1,2,3,6,7: Lender Processing Services, LPS Mortgage Monitor
- 4,9: Based on Fannie Mae 2009 2Q Credit Supplement. These loans are also contained in categories 1-3,6,7, and 8. Converted from serious delinquency (90+ days and in foreclosure) to an estimate of 30+ days and in foreclosure.
- 5,7,10: Based on Freddie Mac 2009 2Q Financial Results Supplement. These loans are also contained in categories 1-3,6,7, and 8. Converted from serious delinquency (90+ days and in foreclosure) to an estimate of 30+ days and in foreclosure.
- The gray highlight shows a default rate of 6-19x higher than that of the loans underwritten by GSEs in the traditional way

^{**} Excludes Fannie subprime/Alt-A/nonprime

^{***} Excludes Freddie subprime/Alt-A/nonprime

Conclusion

Government Policies Caused the Financial Crisis

- Government policies, like CRA and GSE affordable housing mandates, created large number of subprime and Alt-A loans
- These weak loans began defaulting at unprecedented rates, causing sharp decline in the value of MBSs and ABSs and the shutdown of the related securities markets
- Market collapse, combined with mark-to-market accounting, caused massive asset write-downs and questions about bank's solvency
- ▶ Failure of Bear and Lehman caused a freezing of interbank lending and a hoarding of cash, cutting credit availability and deepening the recession

Congress and Administration Respond

Financial Crisis becomes an Excuse for New Regulation

Major Financial Regulation on the Way

- All large financial institutions subject to regulation by the Fed—securities firms, finance companies, insurers, holding companies, hedge funds, private equity funds
- Regulation will include capital, liquidity, leverage and activities—firms can be broken up
- These firms will be seen as too big to fail
- Resolution system for all large financial firms, run by FDIC
- Derivatives likely to be pushed out of banks
- Banks will have higher capital requirements
- Consumer Financial Protection Agency will get substantial power

Effect on the Economy

- Housing problem will remain—prices could still decline further
- Administration policies are slowing foreclosures but not preventing them
- ▶ Fannie and Freddie will cost taxpayers more than \$400 B
- Fed regulation will reduce competition among large financial services firms and impose regulator costs
- Pushing derivatives activity out of banks may cause the business to move overseas, will also reduce availability of derivatives for hedging, raising costs everywhere
- CFPA will add to credit costs

Economy generally weak

- Housing slump will suppress growth
- New regulatory costs, higher banks capital requirements, CFPA, reduction in competition among financial institutions will all add to credit costs
- Then additional taxes: Bush tax cuts expire for incomes over \$250K, higher capital gains taxes
- Credit card reforms have reduced credit availability to consumers and small business start-ups
- ObamaCare imposes substantial new taxes on businesses and individuals
- Unemployment to stay high/Consumer demand weak

Dangers on the Horizon

- Double-dip recession/Fed cannot cut rates any further
- Democrats won't agree to cut taxes
- Republicans won't agree to new spending
- ▶ Election results may not chart a new path
- Long-run: Budget deficits unsustainable, but no clear way to address spending on entitlements without a mandate for someone
- When will China decide the only way we get out of this is by inflating the currency
- The Good News: Americans seem energized to change direction