




# IPAA-TIPRO Luncheon "Out of the Financial Maelstrom & Into the Energy Future" January 13, 2010





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2009 HLSR World's Championship Bar-B-Que Contest





# Erin & Matt tie the Knot October 2008





# Bertram Survives IKE!



# Bear Market 2008







# OXYMORONS TDA Favorites

Great Depression

TOXIC ASSETS!

Marital Bliss

Tight Slacks

Synthetic Natural Gas

Military Intelligence

# Agenda

**I. Introduction**

**II. Top 3 Surprises in 2009**

**III. 2010 Outlook**







# Triple Double Advisors, LLC



|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| <b>Manager</b>                 | Arthur L. Smith, CFA  |
| <b>Dated Established</b>       | August 2007   |
| <b>Location</b>                | Houston, TX   |
| <b>Structure</b>               | Managed account with broker of investor's choosing  |
| <b>Objective</b>               | Triple Double Advisors, LLC ("TDA") seeks to achieve superior capital growth through long-only investments in companies in the energy sector. TDA selectively uses options to mitigate a portion of the risk of owning the underlying securities. |
| <b>Assets Under Management</b> | \$27.5 Million (at December 2009)   |
| <b>Annual Management Fee</b>   | 1.00%   |
| <b>Incentive Fee</b>           | 10% of annual net capital appreciation and subject to a high water mark   |



- Achieve tax-efficient capital appreciation with low portfolio turnover. The quality of assets and management teams do not vary markedly on a day-to-day basis.
- Core holdings in the portfolio are energy companies with strong potential to generate long-term above-average appreciation. Characteristics sought:
  1. Superior assets
  2. Superior management
  3. Superior relative valuation fundamentals
  4. Focus on building net asset value per share
- Avoid “story” stocks with:
  1. Above-average proved undeveloped reserves and speculative acreage positions
  2. High operating cost structures and overhead
  3. Unseasoned or promotional management teams
- Understand the macro energy picture and mitigate the risk of underlying portfolio positions using options. Utilize option expirations to maintain sell discipline and continually re-evaluate portfolio holdings.
- Visit portfolio companies’ headquarters and know the people whom we have selected to protect and grow our client’s capital.





# Handicapping the E&P Horses

RESEARCH and More  
**RESEARCH!**





## TDA Methodology

1. Fundamentals – Know the Horses
2. Know the Conditions of the Track
3. Check the Weather Forecast





# "Picking the Jockeys": Evaluating Management



- We consider visiting portfolio companies' headquarters and knowing the people whom we have selected to protect and grow our clients' capital to be a critical part of our due diligence and investment process.




# Typical Portfolio

- Concentrated core portfolio, 15-25 equity positions
- Roughly equal weights with 3-5 best ideas over-weighted
- Liquid portfolio of large, mid and small capitalization stocks
- Energy Sector Universe
  1. Exploration & Production
  2. Oil & Gas Service
  3. Integrations
  4. Pipelines & Diversified
  5. Refiners & Marketers
  6. Coal
  7. Nuclear
  8. Renewables
- Selectively use options to reduce portfolio risk, but not to increase portfolio leverage including:
  1. Covered calls
  2. Protective puts
  3. Sale of puts with cash reserve held to acquire underlying at expiration
- More than 400 energy stocks in investment universe






# Stock Selection



# Evaluating Sub-Industries



**Exploration & Production: Price to 2010 Cash Flow Ratios**



Sub-industry pricing at a discount relative to other E&P sub-industries.

Move to evaluate individual companies in sub-industry.



# Screening the Investment Universe



|           | Valuation |           |           |           |           |           |           |           | Leverage, Liquidity & Yields |            |            |   |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------------------------|------------|------------|---|
|           | Metric #1 | Metric #2 | Metric #3 | Metric #4 | Metric #5 | Metric #6 | Metric #7 | Metric #8 | Metric #9                    | Metric #10 | Metric #11 |   |
| Company A | 3         | 5         | 9         | 7         | 2         | 1         | 2         | 1         | 3                            | 8          | 8          | A |
| Company B | 13        | 13        | 8         | 11        | 10        | 5         | 6         | 6         | 9                            | 3          | 10         | B |
| Company C | 6         | 7         | 11        | 6         | 1         | 11        | 4         | 13        | 11                           | 5          | 12         | C |
| Company D | 5         | 1         | 2         | 3         | 7         | 2         | 1         | 4         | 14                           | 14         | 3          | D |
| Company E | 4         | 3         | 4         | 10        | 5         | 8         | 9         | 9         | 8                            | 9          | 7          | E |
| Company F | 14        | 14        | 6         | 5         | 9         | 7         | 8         | 7         | 7                            | 2          | 1          | F |
| Company G | 8         | 8         | 5         | 8         | 6         | 10        | 11        | 3         | 2                            | 2          | 9          | G |
| Company H | 1         | 4         | 7         | 4         | 11        | 4         | 7         | 12        | 13                           | 10         | 11         | H |
| Company I | 7         | 6         | 10        | 9         | 4         | 12        | 12        | 2         | 6                            | 6          | 6          | I |
| Company J | 9         | 11        | 12        | 12        | 12        | 9         | 5         | 14        | 1                            | 1          | 2          | J |
| Company K | 12        | 12        | 13        | 13        | 14        | 13        | 13        | 14        | 5                            | 12         | 14         | K |
| Company L | 10        | 10        | 14        | 14        | 13        | 14        | 14        | 8         | 12                           | 13         | 13         | L |
| Company M | 2         | 2         | 3         | 1         | 8         | 3         | 10        | 10        | 4                            | 4          | 5          | M |
| Company N | 11        | 9         | 1         | 2         | 3         | 6         | 3         | 5         | 10                           | 11         | 4          | N |

Expensive relative to peers on multiple metrics.

|           | Profitability |            | Costs      |            |            |            | Growth     |            |            |   | Results       |          |
|-----------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---|---------------|----------|
|           | Metric #12    | Metric #13 | Metric #14 | Metric #15 | Metric #16 | Metric #17 | Metric #18 | Metric #19 | Metric #20 |   | Average Score | TDA Rank |
| Company A | 8             | 7          | 9          | 9          | 7          | 9          | 9          | 12         | 11         | A | 6.5           | 6        |
| Company B | 6             | 12         | 14         | 12         | 10         | 11         | 12         | 7          | 7          | B | 9.3           | 13       |
| Company C | 14            | 10         | 6          | 7          | 14         | 1          | 6          | 14         | 6          | C | 8.3           | 12       |
| Company D | 4             | 9          | 10         | 11         | 6          | 6          | 10         | 9          | 3          | D | 6.2           | 4        |
| Company E | 12            | 11         | 8          | 10         | 5          | 12         | 7          | 10         | 10         | E | 8.1           | 11       |
| Company F | 11            | 4          | 2          | 2          | 4          | 3          | 5          | 8          | 8          | F | 6.4           | 5        |
| Company G | 13            | 5          | 3          | 3          | 2          | 7          | 3          | 3          | 4          | G | 6.0           | 2        |
| Company H | 1             | 1          | 4          | 4          | 11         | 2          | 4          | 6          | 5          | H | 6.1           | 3        |
| Company I | 10            | 8          | 7          | 8          | 1          | 8          | 13         | 5          | 12         | I | 7.6           | 7        |
| Company J | 2             | 3          | 11         | 8          | 9          | 10         | 8          | 11         | 9          | J | 7.7           | 8        |
| Company K | 9             | 2          | 1          | 1          | 3          | 4          | 1          | 1          | 1          | K | 7.9           | 10       |
| Company L | 5             | 14         | 13         | 14         | 13         | 14         | 14         | 4          | 14         | L | 12.0          | 14       |
| Company M | 3             | 13         | 12         | 13         | 12         | 13         | 11         | 13         | 13         | M | 7.8           | 9        |
| Company N | 7             | 6          | 5          | 5          | 8          | 5          | 2          | 2          | 2          | N | 5.4           | 1        |

Great cost structures

Companies that attract our attention for further due diligence and meetings.





# TDA's Historical Performance




## Net Performance <sup>(1)</sup> <sup>(2)</sup>


|             | Jan    | Feb   | Mar   | Apr   | May   | Jun   | Jul    | Aug   | Sep    | Oct    | Nov    | Dec   | YTD/FY |
|-------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| <b>2009</b> | -1.9%  | -9.0% | 10.6% | 12.6% | 21.2% | -9.1% | 6.1%   | 2.1%  | 9.8%   | -3.5%  | 2.2%   | 5.3%  | 51.5%  |
| <b>2008</b> | -12.3% | 12.8% | -1.1% | 10.6% | 8.2%  | 2.9%  | -18.0% | -0.8% | -18.3% | -28.4% | -11.8% | -6.4% | -52.6% |
| <b>2007</b> | 0.5%   | -1.3% | 5.3%  | 5.1%  | 7.5%  | 2.3%  | -1.4%  | -2.3% | 12.0%  | 9.5%   | -5.9%  | 11.6% | 49.8%  |
| <b>2006</b> |        |       |       |       |       |       |        |       |        |        | 5.2%   | -4.2% | 0.9%   |

|                                    | 1 Month | 2009  | 2008   | 2007  | Launch <sup>(3)</sup> |
|------------------------------------|---------|-------|--------|-------|-----------------------|
| <b>Triple Double Advisors, LLC</b> | 5.3%    | 51.5% | -52.6% | 49.8% | 8.5%                  |
| <b>Energy SPDR (XLE)</b>           | 0.9%    | 21.8% | -39.0% | 36.9% | 4.3%                  |

### Net Returns Since Inception



### 2009 Net Returns



(1) All returns are presented net of transaction costs and management fees. (2) Returns displayed include client account managed with the same methodology described herein by Arthur L. Smith while at John S. Herold Advisors, Inc.. Arthur L. Smith, John S. Herold Advisors, Inc. and Triple Double Advisors, LLC ("TDA") have managed investments in other asset classes and/or with different methodologies that have not been included here. (3) Launch date 11/13/2006.





## II. Top 3 Surprises in 2009



# Number 3: What Happened to LNG Imports?






# Worldwide LNG Supplies Under Construction



## Wood Mackenzie Forecast Supply Additions from Capacity Currently Under Construction




➤ With about 7 Bcf/d from new LNG projects and a weak global economy, we believed that there was a significant risk of a sharp increase U.S. imports in 2009.



# EIA U.S. LNG Demand Forecasts



Projected U.S. LNG Demand, EIA




- We knew that the U.S. didn't need much LNG, so the combination of new supply capacity and weak demand did not bode well natural gas prices.



# 2009 Pricing Favored Shipping to U.K.



## U.S. Henry Hub v. U.K. National Balancing Point (Front Month)



- Although prices in both the U.S. and U.K. were depressed throughout the year, for the most part, NBP prices managed to maintain a healthy spread above Henry Hub prices. Nevertheless, this spread has deteriorated and recently has slightly favored sending cargoes to the U.S.






# 2009 LNG Imports Stayed Low



## EIA U.S. LNG Imports



- According to latest available EIA monthly data, LNG imports have been well below 5-year average levels throughout the year as a result of a well supplied gas market. However, there are early indications that with Henry Hub prices rallying and a positive spread relative to NBP, imports have increased to over 3 Bcf/d since in early 2009<sup>(1)</sup>.




# Number 2: U.S. Natural Gas Production Stays Flat







## Baker Hughes U.S. Gas Rig Count



- With the over 50% decline in rig count, many observers expected a sharp decline in natural gas production.





## EIA Form-914 Natural Gas Production



- A steep decline in natural gas production has failed to materialize in 2009. We hypothesize that this is due to a combination of average well productivity and increases in rig efficiency as the rig count has dropped.



# Well Productivity & Rig Efficiency




➤ We noticed two reasons why forecasts for a sharp decline in 2009 natural gas production were challenged:


1. Data showed that wells in 2007 were slightly more productive than 2006. This was the first time since 2000 that there was a year over year increase. We speculated that this increase in well productivity could be the beginning of an emerging trend due to shale wells.

2. Historically, during declines in rig count, completions per rig always spiked. In times of a severe decline in rigs, the efficiency gains could be quite dramatic.

**U.S. Average Well Production**



**U.S. Gas Well Completions per Gas Rig**






# 2008 Natural Gas Well Productivity



## U.S. Average Well Production




- The same graph as the previous page with updated data shows that the average well drilled in 2008 showed another year over year increase in productivity.



# U.S. Natural Gas Rig Count Equilibrium



## Onshore U.S. Natural Gas Supply Growth & Rig Count



- Using rig efficiency and average well productivity, we constructed a very simple model that shows a significant change in the number of gas rigs needed hold U.S. production flat. While this number was about 1,100 rigs given 2007 average well productivity, our latest 2008 data shows that this figure is closer to 700 rigs at current average well productivity levels.
- Thus, current gas rig count appears adequate to sustain current production levels.





# Number 1: XOM Acquires XTO Energy





# Deal Highlights

| Implied Valuation Benchmarks             |               |
|--|---------------|
|  | US\$          |
| <b>Implied Value / Proved Mcfe (6)</b>   | <b>\$2.22</b> |
| Implied Value / Total Resources Mcfe (6) | \$0.91        |
| Implied Value / daily Mcfe (6) produced  | \$10,456      |

| Reserve Estimates by Seller |                 |                 |             |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|
|                             | Proved          |                 |             |
|                             | Reserves        | Production      | R/P         |
| Oil & NGLs (MMbbl)          | 343.4           | 32.1            | 10.7        |
| Natural Gas (Bcf)           | 11,802.9        | 883.5           | 13.4        |
| <b>Total Bcfe (6)</b>       | <b>13,862.7</b> | <b>1,075.90</b> | <b>12.9</b> |
| <b>% Developed</b>          | <b>64%</b>      |                 |             |
| <b>% Gas</b>                | <b>85%</b>      | <b>82%</b>      |             |

| Valuation Breakdown         |                   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|
|                             | US\$MM            |
| <b>Proved Reserve Value</b> | <b>\$30,818.7</b> |
| Non-Proved Reserve Value    | \$10,173.0        |
| <b>Total Valuation</b>      | <b>\$40,991.7</b> |

| Deal Value              |                   |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
|                         | US\$MM            |
| Cash                    | \$0.0             |
| Stock                   | \$31,098.5        |
| Other Equity            | \$0.0             |
| Long term liabilities   | \$11,037.0        |
| Minority Interest       | \$0.0             |
| Working Capital         | (\$1,143.8)       |
| <b>Total Deal Value</b> | <b>\$40,991.7</b> |

| Premium Analysis                        |                |
|---|----------------|
| <b>Implied offer US\$ price / share</b> | <b>\$51.69</b> |
| <i>Premium:</i>                         |                |
| <b>1 day prior to announcement</b>      | <b>24.6%</b>   |


- XOM's proposed acquisition of XTO Energy marks a significant long-term bet on natural gas demand growth over the next 20 – 30 years.
- The price of \$51.69 per share implies a 25% premium, but is well below XTO's mid-2008 price of \$73.



# History of Industry Consolidation



Historical Consolidation Activity 1997-2009




- XOM's acquisition of XTO Energy is the largest global upstream deal since the Chevron-Texaco merger in 2000.



# 2009 Transactions by Region

Worldwide Reserve Transaction Value: YTD 2009

Worldwide Total Deal Value US\$139.1B



- With XOM's acquisition of XTO Energy, N.A. accounts for 67% of global energy deal value in 2009. Both the XOM and SU acquisitions highlight the emerging importance of unconventional assets as a long-term growth driver for the industry.






# Increased Role of Shale in U.S. M&A Activity



## Significant U.S. Onshore Gas Shale Play Upstream Transactions:

### TTV vs. % of Total U.S. TTV (Reserves/Acreage Deals; TTV > US\$10MM)



- Shale gas has been an increasingly large part of the U.S. M&A landscape. Excluding the XOM/XTO deal, there have been approximately \$33 billion in U.S. onshore shale deals since 2003. In the same period, international majors have spent approximately \$6 billion buying into U.S. onshore shale gas plays.






## III. 2010 Outlook



# Oil Review: World Demand

Global Demand Growth 2008/2009/2010  
thousand barrels per day



- The IEA is projecting a return to oil demand growth in 2010 with nearly all of the increases coming from non OECD countries. Currently, oil demand in 2010 is projected to be 86.2 MMBbl/day.
- Of the +435 MBbl/day demand increase forecasted for Asia, more than half (+294 MBbl/day) is attributable to China. However, Chinese increases are predicated on observed growth in bitumen, lubricants and coke that appear to be related to the government's stimulus measures.



# Oil: 2010 Forecasts

|                      | WORLD DEMAND |             | DEMAND GROWTH<br>10 vs. 09 | NON-OPEC SUPPLY |             | CALL ON OPEC inc. IRAQ |             |
|----------------------|--------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|
|                      | 2009         | 2010        |                            | 2009            | 2010        | 2009                   | 2010        |
| Barcap Total         | 84.6         | 85.4        | 0.8                        | 50.0            | 49.6        | 34.6                   | 35.8        |
| OECD                 | 45.6         | 45.5        | -0.1                       |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.0         | 39.9        | 0.9                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Goldman Sachs        | 84.7         | 86.4        | 1.7                        | 50.9            | 50.7        | 33.8                   | 35.7        |
| OECD                 |              |             |                            |                 |             | 0.0                    | 0.0         |
| Non OECD             |              |             |                            |                 |             |                        |             |
| IEA Total            | 84.9         | 86.2        | 1.3                        | 51.1            | 51.9        | 33.8                   | 34.3        |
| OECD                 | 45.5         | 45.5        | 0.0                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.3         | 40.7        | 1.4                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| EIA Total            | 84.1         | 85.4        | 1.3                        | 50.2            | 50.4        | 33.9                   | 35.0        |
| OECD                 | 45.5         | 45.6        | 0.1                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 38.7         | 39.8        | 1.1                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Deutsche Bank        | 84.7         | 86.0        | 1.3                        | 51.0            | 51.3        | 33.7                   | 34.7        |
| OECD                 | 45.4         | 45.6        | 0.2                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.3         | 40.3        | 1.0                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| OPEC                 | 84.3         | 85.1        | 0.8                        | 50.9            | 51.2        | 33.4                   | 33.9        |
| OECD                 | 45.8         | 45.7        | -0.1                       |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 38.5         | 39.4        | 0.9                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| BNP Paribas          | 84.9         | 86.3        | 1.4                        | 51.0            | 51.6        | 33.9                   | 34.7        |
| OECD                 |              |             |                            |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             |              |             |                            |                 |             |                        |             |
| BofA-ML              | 84.7         | 86.7        | 2.0                        | 51.0            | 51.2        | 33.7                   | 35.5        |
| OECD                 | 45.6         | 46.1        | 0.5                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.1         | 40.6        | 1.5                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| <b>Average Total</b> | <b>84.6</b>  | <b>85.9</b> | <b>1.3</b>                 | <b>50.8</b>     | <b>51.0</b> | <b>33.9</b>            | <b>35.0</b> |
| OECD                 | <b>45.6</b>  | <b>45.7</b> | <b>0.1</b>                 |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | <b>39.0</b>  | <b>40.1</b> | <b>1.1</b>                 |                 |             |                        |             |

Almost all demand growth comes from Non-OECD.

Once again, almost no growth from non-OPEC.





# Oil: 2010 Forecasts

|                      | WORLD DEMAND |             | DEMAND GROWTH<br>10 vs. 09 | NON-OPEC SUPPLY |             | CALL ON OPEC inc. IRAQ |             |
|----------------------|--------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|
|                      | 2009         | 2010        |                            | 2009            | 2010        | 2009                   | 2010        |
| Barcap Total         | 84.6         | 85.4        | 0.8                        | 50.0            | 49.6        | 34.6                   | 35.8        |
| OECD                 | 45.6         | 45.5        | -0.1                       |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.0         | 39.9        | 0.9                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Goldman Sachs        | 84.7         | 86.4        | 1.7                        | 50.9            | 50.7        | 33.8                   | 35.7        |
| OECD                 |              |             |                            |                 |             | 0.0                    | 0.0         |
| Non OECD             |              |             |                            |                 |             |                        |             |
| IEA Total            | 84.9         | 86.2        | 1.3                        | 51.1            | 51.9        | 33.8                   | 34.3        |
| OECD                 | 45.5         | 45.5        | 0.0                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.3         | 40.7        | 1.4                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| EIA Total            | 84.1         | 85.4        | 1.3                        | 50.2            | 50.4        | 33.9                   | 35.0        |
| OECD                 | 45.5         | 45.6        | 0.1                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 38.7         | 39.8        | 1.1                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Deutsche Bank        | 84.7         | 86.0        | 1.3                        | 51.0            | 51.3        | 33.7                   | 34.7        |
| OECD                 | 45.4         | 45.6        | 0.2                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.3         | 40.3        | 1.0                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| OPEC                 | 84.3         | 85.1        | 0.8                        | 50.9            | 51.2        | 33.4                   | 33.9        |
| OECD                 | 45.8         | 45.7        | -0.1                       |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 38.5         | 39.4        | 0.9                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| BNP Paribas          | 84.9         | 86.3        | 1.4                        | 51.0            | 51.6        | 33.9                   | 34.7        |
| OECD                 |              |             |                            |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             |              |             |                            |                 |             |                        |             |
| BofA-ML              | 84.7         | 86.7        | 2.0                        | 51.0            | 51.2        | 33.7                   | 35.5        |
| OECD                 | 45.6         | 46.1        | 0.5                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | 39.1         | 40.6        | 1.5                        |                 |             |                        |             |
| <b>Average Total</b> | <b>84.6</b>  | <b>85.9</b> | <b>1.3</b>                 | <b>50.8</b>     | <b>51.0</b> | <b>33.9</b>            | <b>35.0</b> |
| OECD                 | <b>45.6</b>  | <b>45.7</b> | <b>0.1</b>                 |                 |             |                        |             |
| Non OECD             | <b>39.0</b>  | <b>40.1</b> | <b>1.1</b>                 |                 |             |                        |             |

## Bull Case

2010  
Demand  
86.4  
+1.8


OPEC  
Call  
+2.0

Non-Opec  
-0.3



# Natural Gas: Price Forecasts

## NYMEX HH Natural Gas Forward Curves




- With production declines fairly unimpressive and an increased reliance on cold weather to spur larger than normal storage draws to support prices, we see extremely bullish 2010 gas price targets as increasingly remote.



# Oil v. Gas

Ratio of Oil to Natural Gas Price



- The traditional ratio of oil to natural gas of 6:1 ratio has been consistently exceeded since 2007.
- Domestic natural gas supply and demand fundamentals that have “decoupled” from global oil fundamentals are largely responsible.
- Currently, forwards markets offer little indication that this is likely to change in the near future.



## Macro Energy Outlook

- We continue to have a preference for oily E&P's compared to gassy counterparts as long-term fundamentals for oil appear more compelling.
- Prolific shale wells are a "game changer" and data indicates that the U.S. natural gas market will remain well supplied. Even when demand growth returns, the industry appears well positioned to grow supply.

## Portfolio Implications

- Oily E&P's that are able to grow production within cash flow are among our favorites.
- Gassy E&P's must be trading at attractive valuations and have strong footholds in the most attractive shale plays to garner our interest.

## Evaluating Management

- Continue visiting companies and understand management's strategy to steer company given underlying energy fundamentals.





# Fishing in Alaska







# My MIT PhD Candidate









OWNERS COMPANY



NO. 11 RUNNER UP







# 31 Hours at Sea





# 31 Hours at Sea



# Getting a Closer Look at Energy Assets



Fishing rod

Fishing rod





# Testosterone Heaven!!





# GREAT BBQ





# Synergistic Location -- GUNS





# Synergistic Location -- Fishing Tackle







# Strategic Partnership

**TRI-STATE OUTFITTERS**  
TAXIDERMY  
SOUTH TEXAS HUNTING 713-465-7388

8917



No Matter How Sick Your Pet Is  
You can bring him home to the kids







# Bad News! JV Dissolves





Tri State Taxidermy  
Has Moved to  
1747 Campbell Rd.  
Houston, Tx 77080  
Office : 713-465-7388  
After Hours : 281-639-2255



★ ← New Location

Campbell

Long Point

I-10

★ You are Here





# *Positive proof of global warming.*



**18th  
Century**

**1900**

**1950**

**1970**

**1980**

**2009**